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Abstract—Wireless sensor networks are threat-
ened by numerous attacks. Therefore, security is
now becoming an important new path of research
and attempts to counter these attacks. However,
even if research finds solutions to counter known
attacks, we show in this article that there is a threat
in wireless sensor networks by using the 802.15.4
protocol. It is possible to hide data in PHY and
MAC layers with steganographic techniques. In
this article, we explain what steganography is, how
we can use it in the layers of 802.15.4 protocol, how
an attacker can do an attack and what we can do
to detect this kind of threat.
Index Terms—wireless sensor networks,
steganography, security, 802.15.4 protocol, MAC
layer
I. Introduction
Steganography is an old technique that has existed
since antiquity. Herodotus, a Greek historian who
lived in the 5th century B.C., relates how the Greeks
sent and received warnings of enemy movements using
a message underneath the wax of a writing tablet.
Other examples were the use of secret ink to hide
information on a white paper or the use of micro-dot
by intelligence agencies in World War 2.
The word steganography comes etymologically from
the Greek words Stegano, meaning I cover, and
Graphô, meaning I write, and is literally cover what I
write - or more simply, hide data. If cryptography is to
encrypt and render a data unreadable, steganography
is the way to hide the existence of this data.
In this paper, we show that it is possible to use
steganographic techniques to hide the existence of
data in the 802.15.4 protocol. This protocol is a
protocol widely used in wireless sensor networks. This
protocol specifies the PHY and MAC layers of com-
munication, because it provides an energy-efficient
solution for communication between wireless sensors.
Zigbee [1], the most used protocol in wireless sensor
networks, uses this 802.15.4 protocol for the communi-
cation layer. We explain in this article that this threat
exists and uses 802.15.4 protocol fields to hide data
in the network and create a steganographic channel.
By using steganographic methods, this data becomes
undetectable in the wireless sensor network if there is
not a steganographic detection policy.
In Section 2 of this paper, we present previous work
on steganography and specifically in communication
protocols. In Section 3, we show the possibility of
hiding data in wireless sensor networks by using a
PHY layer field of the 802.15.4 protocol. In Section
4, we describe different possibilities for hiding data in
MAC layer fields of the 802.15.4 protocol. In Section
5, we analyse risks and limits of this kind of attack.
In Section 6, we discuss about solutions for protecting
wireless sensor network against steganography attacks
in layers of the 802.15.4 protocol. Finally, we conclude
in Section 6.
II. Related work
The aim of steganography consists of embedding
data (text, movie, picture, etc...) called the secret
message, in another media or support [2]. The support
where the data is hidden is named the cover object.
Once the secret message is embedded in the cover mes-
sage, the result is called a stego object. For example,
we can hide a picture in another picture, and in this
latter picture, we cannot see that the first picture is
hidden inside.
When we speak about steganography, we refer to the
analogy of Alice and Bob [3]. Alice and Bob are in
jail and are monitored by a warden, Wendy. If Alice
wants to send a message to Bob, this message must
go through Wendy. If Wendy sees that the message
contains an important message (for example the hour
of an escape), Wendy will never give the message
to Bob. Therefore, Alice should find a way to hide
information in the message without Wendy seeing it.
For example, Alice will hide a message in another
2message. If we read every other letter, we can read the
hidden message; but if Wendy reads this message, she
will not see the hidden message. In steganography, this
example shows that the steganographic method must
be kept secret (if Wendy knows the steganographic
technique, she can read the message) and all partic-
ipants who want to communicate should know this
method to hide and to read the data. This example of
Alice and Bob can be implemented in wireless sensor
networks: where Alice and Bob would be two sensors,
and Wendy would be another sensor or a device that
listens to network communications.
A lot of steganographic techniques exist [3], but
the most important goal of actual research work in
steganography is to hide pictures in an other picture.
These techniques have given birth to watermarking
[4], which consists of watermarking a picture to add
data. For example, watermarking can be used to add
the name of a patient or private information to a
medical picture (scanner, radiography, MRI).
Several steganographic techniques aim to use specifici-
ties of communication protocols to hide data and use
communication layer fields as the cover object. This
use of steganographic data in communication layer
fields provides the creation of a hidden channel in the
network. Only devices that know in which fields the
data is hidden can read data or write data. They can
invisibly exchange data in the network if the network
does not know the steganographic technique.
[5], [6] and [7] show different possibilities for hiding
data by using specificities of protocol to create a
hidden channel (steganographic channel). The most
used techniques consist of using the reserved field of
the protocol. Thus, [5] uses the reserved field in the
TCP packet header of the TCP/IP protocol, as we
can see in Figure 1, and gives the possibility to hide
six bits per exchanged packet in this example.
Fig. 1. Reserved bytes in TCP Packet Header
This technique can also be used to create a hidden
channel in a wireless local area network as explained
in [8]. This example is closer to what we can do in
wireless sensor networks if we try to apply this method
in the 802.15.4 protocol.
In wireless sensor networks, the use of steganography
has been first mentioned in [9], with the conclusion
that it would be difficult to apply it in wireless sensor
network, because steganography is more applied with
picture or video. However [10] and [11] show possibil-
ities using noise in the physical layer of the 802.15.4
protocol to hide data and create a steganographic
channel. If these examples are known possibilities for
using the 802.15.4 protocol to hide data, and show
that steganography is a new way of research in wireless
sensor network, to the best of our knowledge [12], we
do not know of an example of steganography using
communication of MAC layer fields in the 802.15.4
protocol.
III. Hiding data in PHY IEEE 802.15.4
In this section, we show the possibility of hiding
data in the PHY layer of the 802.15.4 protocol.
The general structure of a PHY frame can be seen in
Figure 2. This structure can be found in [13].
Fig. 2. PHY frame structure
The PHY Header field provides the length of the
PHY Service Data Unit field. This field is encoded on
one byte, but only seven bits on this byte are used - the
eighth is reserved. Because this eighth bit is reserved
and never used, it is possible to use it to hide data.
A stego message should be sent one bit by packet and
the receiver should read every bit of all sent packets
to recover the secret message.
If this possibility requires a large number of packets
to be sent, we can combine it with other hidden bits
in the MAC layer to decrease the number of packets
required to exchange a stego message.
IV. Hiding data in MAC IEEE 802.15.4
In this section, we show the possibility of hiding
data in the MAC layer of the 802.15.4 protocol.
Frames in the MAC layer of the 802.15.4 protocol are
different and depend on the kind of packet sent. The
MAC layer uses 4 different kinds of frames:
1) - Data frame
2) - Beacon frame
3) - Acknowledgment frame
4) - MAC command frame
We will discuss ways to hide data in these different
kinds of frames.
3Fig. 3. MAC data frame structure
A. Data frame
The general structure of a MAC data frame can be
seen in Figure 3. This structure can be found in [13].
In this frame, the Frame Control field, Data
Sequence Number field, and Address Information
field provide possibilities to hide information.
1) Frame control field: The Frame Control field is
represented by Figure 4.
Fig. 4. Frame control field structure
We can see that the 7-9th bits and the 12-13th bits
are reserved and can be used to hide a stego object.
Here, we can encode three and two bits, respectively,
in these fields.
2) Sequence Number field: The Sequence Number
field contains the numbering of each packet on 8 bits,
used in particular with packet acknowledgements to
specify which packet has been acknowledged. The
value of this number corresponds to the PIB macDSN
variable. This variable is initialized randomly, then
incremented after each received packet.
If we choose this initialized number of the PIB
variable, we can hide a stego object (or a part of the
stego object) inside. We can hide up to one byte of
data in this field.
3) Address Info field: The Address Info field is
represented in Figure 5. Its size varies between four
and 20 bytes.
Fig. 5. Address Info field structure
The Source Address field is interesting, because we
can choose to have a short (16 bits) or an extended
source address (64 bits). It is possible to hide data
in this field, for example, if we specify a nonexistent
source address. With this nonexistent address, we
can hide a stego object with a size up to 64 bits.
This steganographic technique can be particularly
undetectable if the network does not know the exact
number of nodes present in the network, especially in
a big network where nodes can be added over time.
B. Beacon frame
The general structure of a MAC Beacon frame can
be seen in Figure 6.
Fig. 6. Beacon frame structure
We find the same possibilities for hiding information
as in the Data Frame, in the Frame Control and
in the Source Address Information field. However, in
the Beacon Frame, the source address information is
limited to 10 bytes; yet the Beacon Sequence Number
field give us another way to use the cover object.
The Beacon Sequence Number field contains the se-
quence number of the Beacon node. This number
is given by the macBSN variable. This variable is
ordinarily initialized randomly. As in the Sequence
Number field of the MAC data frame, we can volun-
tarily choose the value of this number and then hide
up to one byte of data.
C. Acknowledgement frame
The general structure of an Acknowledgement frame
can be seen in figure 7.
Fig. 7. Acknowledgement frame structure
We find the same possibilities for hiding data in the
Frame Control field and Data Sequence Number field.
Both are identical to fields of the MAC data frame.
D. Command frame
The general structure of a command frame can be
seen in figure 8.
Here, we can see that the Frame Control, Data
Sequence Number and Address Information fields
provide the same possibilities of hiding data in the
command frame as in the MAC data frame.
4Fig. 8. Command frame structure
V. Analysis of the threat
In this section, we present what kind of attack can
be made by hiding data in the 802.15.4 protocol and
what we can do to detect and counter these attacks.
A. Threats
In the previous section, we presented a list of
possibilities for hiding data in different fields of the
communication frame of the 802.15.4 protocol. Obvi-
ously, there are other possibilities for hiding data in
the 802.15.4, but we have chosen to present the most
significant parts. These different possibilities show
how it is simple for an attacker to hide an important
number of data in a communication in a wireless
sensor network.
If we take the example of a sent MAC data frame, an
attacker could hide in the different fields that we have
seen previously :
1) 3 + 2 = 5 bits for the frame control field
2) 8 bits for the data sequence number field
3) 64 bits for the address info field
...making a total of 77 hidden bits. This number of bits
is enough to exchange one or more stego messages.
The attacker can very easily create an undetectable
hidden channel in a wireless sensor network, if there
is not a mechanism to detect it. With this hidden
channel, the attacker can execute new attacks in the
network.
For example, we can imagine a threat model where an
attacker uses a hidden channel to prepare a denial-of-
service attack. This preparation can be found in the
representation of Figure 9.
In this representation, the A, B, C and D black
nodes are malicious or compromise nodes controlled
by the attacker. White nodes are normal nodes of
a wireless sensor network. The A node is an inter-
face between the attacker device and other malicious
nodes. With the steganographic channel made by
using specific fields of the 802.15.4 protocol, the A, B,
C and D nodes can communicate without alerting the
other nodes of the network (if there is not a policy of
steganographic channel detection), even if the network
uses a trust reputation policy and uses a watchdog
mechanism [14]. In this attack scenario, the attacker
Fig. 9. Representation of a hidden/steganographic channel in
a wireless sensor network
will send an hour of onset to A to know when a denial-
of-service attack should begin. After that, A will send
a stego message containing the hour, minutes and
seconds through the hidden channel to synchronize the
attack.
This attack hour can be easily contained in 13 bits
of the Frame Control field and the Data Sequence
Number field of a MAC data frame. Then, A will
invisibly send this stego message to B, which will send
it to C, and then D. All nodes will be synchronized
and could launch an attack at the time wished by the
attacker.
This example is just one possibility of using steganog-
raphy in the 802.15.4 protocol. The steganographic
channel can also be used for monitoring the network
and informing an attacker of what the wireless sensor
network detects or senses.
Nevertheless, we present an obvious way to hide data
in the communication fields of the 802.15.4. We can
imagine that an attacker can complicate the use of
steganography by combining different fields, dividing
a stego object into many packets, encrypting this data,
using just one bit of a field to launch an attack,
exchanging Morse communication or choosing a signif-
icant size of the data payload. We cannot make an ex-
haustive list of possibilities to create a steganographic
channel, because steganographic possibilities are only
limited by the attacker’s imagination.
B. Limits
Steganographic channel can not be detected with-
out a specific detection policy. But if this policy exists
and the network monitores some fields of PHY and
MAC layers, the steganographic channel could be
easily detected. Then an attacker have to find other
5possibilities in the PHY or MAC layers to hide the
data, but with a number of possibilities that decreases,
the size of data exchanged increases the number of
packet exchanged.
The Figure 10 shows the number of packets needed for
Fig. 10. Number of Data frame packets exchanged for a data
size needed with use of different fields of PHY and MAC layers
of the 802.15.4 Protocol
sending a size of data with the different possibilities
that we have discussed. We can obviously see that
without a detection policy, an attacker can exchange a
size of data without increase considerably the number
of packet exchanged. However with a detection policy,
if an attacker has fewer possibilities of bits for hiding
data, the number of exchanged packets will increase
and the network could monitore an abnormal activity
and presumes the existence of a steganographic chan-
nel. Another problem for an attacker can be that, with
a large number of packets exchanged, the lifetime of
malicious nodes will decrease.
VI. Prevent steganographic attacks
As we saw before, there are many possibilities for
creating a steganographic channel for an attacker.
Thus, we cannot find a single solution to prevent the
use of a hidden channel, but as explained before, we
can limit the possibilities of cover objects and increase
then the number of packets exchanged by an attacker.
The activity generated by the steganographic channel
will avoid to detect it.
To prevent possibilities of steganographic attacks, we
propose a set of rules for detection policy in wireless
sensor networks which use the 802.15.4 protocol:
• Set the reserved bits : set to 0 the 8th reserved
bit of the PHY header of the PHY layer, the 7th,
8th, 9th, 12th and 13th reserved bits of the frame
control field of the MAC layer.
• Set the DSN and BSN fields : the DSN and the
BSN fields of MAC layer have to be set to a
departure value and no more a random value.
• Set size of the data payload field : the size of data
payload of the MAC layer have to be set if it is
able. If it is not, we have to choose a limit number
of possible sizes of the field.
• Limit the number of sensor address : the source
address field have to be short (16 bits), if the
number of nodes of the network is small. If the
number of sensor cannot be known when the
network is created, the routing protocol have to
provide the number of nodes of the network. We
can then know if the source info address field
of the Mac layer contains an address which are
bigger than the number of nodes.
This set of rules to become efficient has to be
coupled with use of watchdog mechanisms. Each com-
munication between two sensors will be overheard by
a third sensor, which monitore data exchanged and if
PHY and MAC layer respect the set of rules or not.
However the use of watchdog has an energy cost for a
wireless sensor network, because each communication
needs 3 sensors (a sender, a receiver, a watchdog),
and it is known [15] that overhearing or sending
data energy costs are nearly the same, the energy
consumption for sending data will be multiplied by
1.5 times. To reduce this coefficient we still have to
find others solutions where watchdog overheard not
all communications but this is another problematic of
research.
Our set of rules does not prevent against all pos-
sibilities of steganographic channel creation, but it
limits the possibilities for hiding data and we assume
that with our policy detection, the number of packets
exchanged for created a steganographic channel with
PHY and MAC layer of 802.15.4 protocol will increase.
This augmentation of data exchanged can be monitore
by the watchdog and it can presume the existence
of a steganographic channel if an average number of
packets exchanged can be previously set or with the
use of steganalysis detection [3].
Finally if we respect the set of rules and the use
of watchdogs, an attacker can always find another
ways to create steganographic attacks but he would
have some difficulty to find new cover objects without
increase the number of packets exchanged.
6VII. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a new threat with
the use of steganography in the 802.15.4 protocol,
and particularly if an attacker uses steganographic
methods to hide data or create a hidden channel. We
show that hidden data possibilities and the creation of
new kind of attacks are numerous. We proposed a set
of rules and the use of watchdog to limit possibilities
of steganographic attacks. However, steganography is
a new research path in wireless sensor networks and
we mean that some other possibilities of cover objects
for steganographic attacks can be found. In our future
works, we want to search for other solutions to detect
hidden data using steganalysis and also find energy-
efficient solutions based on steganography in order to
reinforce wireless sensor network security.
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